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Abstract: This paper tries to unveil the main factors behind the triumph of the pro-
independence vote in the 2017 Regional Election in Catalonia. The empirical 
analysis, which is carried out at the county level and by using a spatial econometric 
model, reveals that geographical location matters. The estimation results also 
suggest that the pro-independence vote is mainly linked to the birthplace of 
individuals. More specifically, it shows that the independence feeling is weaker the 
higher the share of citizens born outside Catalonia. On the other side, young and 
highly educated people are more prone to independence. Additionally, it is shown 
that people working in the public sector are more likely to vote for a political party 
in favor of Catalonia remaining in Spain, while the opposite happens for those 
voters working in construction. Finally, the results seem to dispel some myths 
associated with the role played by the county’s size and level of income on the pro-
independence vote. 
Keywords: Catalonia; pro-independence vote; explanatory factors; spatial 
econometrics. 




December 21st, 2017. This date is going to be remembered for a long time in 
Catalonia, Spain and, maybe, in the rest of Europe. The Regional Election that took 
place at this date will most become part of the history books since the main issue at 
stake was, actually, the hypothetical independence of Catalonia from Spain. It will 
be borne in mind not only for the outcome but also for the many unprecedented 
events that took place before it. Following the ´yes´ result of the unofficial and 
illegal referendum on October 1st, 2017 in favor of independence, the Spanish 
Senate (Low Chamber), fearing a secessionist movement, approved the use, for the 
first time in its history, of the article 155 of the 1978 Spanish Constitution, which 
allowed the Central Government to assume control of Catalonian institutions. Just 
immediately, the Catalonian Parliament was dissolved and new elections were 
called for December. In this scenario, we believe that this call was an indirect but 
(contrary to the referendum) legal way of figuring out whether people living in 
Catalonia were for or against remaining in Spain.  
This is so due to the fact that, if anything characterizes the recent political context 
in Catalonia, is the existence of two complete opposite blocks regarding potential 
independence. One of them made up of the three Catalonian secessionist parties 
(Junts per Catalunya, Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya-Cataluya Sí, and 
Candidatura  d’Unitat Popular), while the other grouped what could be called 
constitutionalist forces.1 The outcome of the election, with the three mentioned 
                                                            
1 Although, as indicated by a reviewer, Catalunya en Comú-Podem (CatComú-Podem) keeps a 
somewhat ambiguous position in this respect, we can state that the official position is that they are 
not pro-independence or, at least, that this political party is not in favor of the independence process 
implemented by the three parties belonging to the pro-independence block.  
political parties explicitly supporting independence winning absolute majority in 
the Parliament (although not in the number of votes), has not removed the 
uncertainty around the independence issue in Catalonia but embarks Catalonia and 
Spain upon a complex and uncertain process of necessary mutual understanding. 
While relatively recent, the literature on Catalonian independence is so vast that it 
is impossible to do justice to it in a few words. Many papers (including Oskam, 
2014; Boylan, 2015; Olivieri, 2015; Orriols and Rondon, 2016; Lepič, 2017; and 
Carbonell, 2018 to name only a selected few) have addressed the Catalonian issue 
from different perspectives: social, economic, geopolitical, cultural, historical, 
legal, and so on. This is not our goal here, however.2 Our aim is, paying attention 
to the pro-independence vote of the December 2017 election, to try to shed some 
light about voting patterns (why people voted what they voted), and draw some 
relevant conclusions for the future. To the best of our knowledge, there are no 
papers addressing this issue yet. 
Although there are many reasons motivating this paper, there is one that, in our 
view, is very important: the existence of what, according to our estimation results 
can be considered, at least partially, as wrong interpretations made by some popular 
press and media reports. Just to mention some of them, it has become regular in the 
last few months to read sentences such as the higher the size (measured for example 
in terms of population), the lower the percentage of votes in favor of independence, 
or even contradictory statements regarding income, so that you can read that the 
richer the census section, the lower the pro-independence share, or just the 
                                                            
2 It is not our goal, either, to assess the recent shift of behavior of both voters and politicians, 
probably linked, as many scholars have concluded, to the economic crisis (see e.g., for the case 
under study, Khenkin, 2018; Vidal, 2018). 
opposite.3 To say it clearly and emphatically, the results obtained in this paper cast 
doubt on these interpretations, not to say that they are plainly wrong. The problem 
here is that these popular views are based on spurious bivariate correlations that 
should not be taken at face value. This fact suggests that, to assess properly the 
influence of potential explanatory factors in favor of the pro-independence vote, 
you need to first specify a multivariate model and, then, evaluate jointly their 
impact. 
Clearly related to the fact that to obtain solid, well-footed conclusions we need to 
model the issue at stake, there is an important point usually mentioned in the 
popular press that, if overlooked, could affect seriously the results obtained: 
namely, the geographical disjointness of the so-called “two Catalonias”. 
Territorially, 2017 election’s results present, as we will show later on, an image of 
two Catalonias with quite different views on independence: one is for, the other 
against it. From an operational point of view, this fact can produce the presence in 
the model of what is termed as “spatial dependence”, and this being so, calls for a 
methodological approach to deal with it. Otherwise, the results obtained would be 
unreliable and almost certainly lead to spurious conclusions (see e.g. Anselin, 
1988). This is the main contribution of the paper, since, as far as we know, it is the 
first one, regardless of the case study, using a spatial econometric approach to 
                                                            
3 For instance, the digital newspaper El Confidencial (22.12.17) wrote: “In general, in the largest 
and most populated cities the percentage of the vote for the sovereign block has been lower than in 
the smallest towns and municipalities”. In the same vein, the newspaper La Vanguardia (9.9.18) 
wrote: "The independence movement concentrates the highest level of support in the areas with the 
smaller population”. As for income, in the webpage www.libremercado.com you can read that “the 
vote for independence is much higher in Catalonia’s poorest area” while in the website of the 
newspaper El País (28.9.17) was written: “independence is more popular among Catalans with 
higher incomes”. We are not saying these statements are incorrect, but they convey to the reader a 
causal relationship that probably does not exist. 
address voting behavior. Specifically, we formally test for the presence of spatial 
dependence and, then, use spatial econometric techniques to model voters’ 
behavior.4 
Bearing all these considerations in mind, here, as in many other cases, the first 
crucial question has to do with data.5 Ideally, we should use individual data but, 
unfortunately, these data either do not exist or are quite inaccurate (as the 
discrepancy between the expected outcome according to pre-election polls and the 
real outcome of the election has shown in many cases). Therefore, we use aggregate 
data, having three options: the use of provincial (4 units), county (41)6 or municipal 
(947) data. The first option is too aggregate for our purposes while, between the 
other two, there is a trade-off related to data availability. Because of this, we finally 
decided to run the analysis at the county level, as we think it is informative enough 
and, needless to say, opens up the possibility for richer data with respect to 
explanatory factors. In any case, we have to admit that one needs to be cautious 
when interpreting the results because of the well-known problems related to the use 
of aggregate data, such as the ecological fallacy and the Modifiable Areal Unit 
Problem (MAUP) effect. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section presents, 
quite briefly, the pro-independence outcome of the election, paying special 
                                                            
4 Spatial econometric techniques have been used, nevertheless, to deal with other policy issues such 
as, for example, the decision regarding public expenditure (Prota and Grisorio, 2018). 
5 This is always a key point. There are papers using individual data collected from the Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), an independent entity of the Ministry of the Presidency of Spain 
which conducts the most popular elections’ surveys (see e.g. Ansolabehere and Puy, 2016). On the 
other side, there are papers employing quite aggregated data, for example regional data (Crescenzi 
et al., 2018).  
6 From 2015 on there are 42 counties including Moianès, which official constitution was carried out 
in 2015. However, in our empirical analysis on voting behavior (section 3) we consider 41 counties 
for reasons of data availability. In other words, Moianés was deleted from the dataset. 
attention to the distribution of votes at the county level. Due to the geographical 
allocation of votes, the presence of spatial dependence is then tested and confirmed. 
Subsequently, we propose a model trying to explain the percentage of the pro-
independence vote in each county. The necessity of incorporating spatial effects in 
the model specification is evaluated and, according to the results, a spatial lag (or 
spatial autoregressive) model is estimated. The last section summarizes the main 
findings and concludes the article. 
 
2. The 2017 Regional Election in Catalonia: The triumph of 
the pro-independence vote 
With regard to the most outstanding outcome of the 2017 Catalonian Regional 
Election, it is important to know that the three pro-independence parties won 47,5% 
of the votes which, due to the application of D’Hondt method and the allocation of 
mandates into the four Catalonian provinces, account for 70 out of 135 seats 
(51,9%) in the Catalonian Parliament. In other words, the pro-independence parties 
won absolute majority in the Regional Parliament. 
Nonetheless, the distribution for counties, displayed in Figure 1, was quite 
heterogeneous. In nine counties, the percentage of votes for pro-independence 
parties was over 75%; namely, more than three out of four people living in them 
supported independence for Catalonia. On the opposite side, there were also nine 
counties where this share was lower than 50%; in other words, in these counties 
secessionist parties failed to secure a share of more than 50%. As for the 
geographical distribution of votes, there seems to be a clear pattern. As a rule of 
thumb, people residing in the coastal areas (more populated than the interior) were 
not in favor of independence (this area has started to be called “Tabarnia”), whereas 
those living in most counties located in the interior of Catalonia were. Although the 
analysis is carried out at county level, it is interesting to know that the distribution 
of votes for municipalities, displayed in the Appendix (Figure A1), conveys 
basically the same message. In any case, there were some exceptions that only the 
analysis at municipal level allows us to detect. By way of illustration, there are some 
municipalities, such as Carme, Orpí and Castellolí (in the county of Anoia), Mura 
(Bagés), Orriu (Maresme) and Subirats (Alto Penedés), reporting a clear support for 
independence but surrounded by other municipalities clearly against it. 
Although enlightening, a bit of caution is recommended with maps when trying to 
show the existence of geographical patterns or, in more technical terms, the 
presence of spatial dependence. This is so because the conclusions to be drawn are 
highly sensitive to the number and width of the intervals used. Hence, in order to 
check whether the initial impression from Figure 1 was correct, we computed the 
most widely used and best-known test for spatial dependence. We are referring to 




, for 𝑖 𝑗.7 In this case, 𝑦 𝑦  is the share 
of votes for pro-independence parties at county 𝑖 𝑗 , 𝑦 refers to the mean, 𝑤  is an 
element of the distance matrix 𝑊 between each pair of counties, ∑ ∑ 𝑤  is a 
standardization factor that corresponds to the sum of all the weights, and 𝑁 is the 
                                                            
7 Lepič (2017) also uses this indicator to identify spatial clusters in previous elections in Catalonia. 
total number of counties (41). The results,8 using the inverse of the square of the 
Euclidean distance between the corresponding county centroids as the (row-
standardized) distance matrix,9 revealed a strong spatial dependence in the 
distribution of votes (Moran’s I statistic equals to 0.275, with an associated p-value 
of 0.000). As an add-on, the analysis at municipal level showed, as expected, an 
even higher degree of spatial dependence (Moran’s I statistic equals to 0.474, with 
an associated p-value of 0.000). 
It was also interesting to know, having proved the existence of spatial dependence, 
where was higher. To answer this question and then identify spatial clusters, we 
used Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA), given by 𝐼
∑ ⁄
∑ 𝑤 𝑦 𝑦  (Anselin, 1995).10 When applied to our case, these 
indicators allowed us to detect differences in the spatial clustering among counties 
(or municipalities in Appendix A). The results (Figure 2) confirmed the existence 
of a cluster of counties presenting a relatively low share of the pro-independence 
vote that, basically, matches with “Tabarnia” since it is made up of Maresme, Vallès 
Oriental, Vallès Occidental, Barcelonès, Baix Llobregat, Garraf, Baix Penedès, and 
Tarragonès. On the contrary, county clustering in favor of independence was not so 
clear, as only Ripollès, Garrotxa and Berguedà11 shape a small spatial cluster. That 
is to say, the pro-independence vote seems to be more dispersed, from a 
geographical point of view, than the anti-independence vote. It is also convenient 
                                                            
8 The software STATA was used to compute Moran’s I and also to estimate equations presented in 
Section 3. In the estimates, the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance was used instead of the 
standard estimator. 
9 In any case, they were robust to the use of alternative matrices. 
10 Moran’s I statistic is an aggregate indicator, computed as the sum of LISA’s value for each county 
(divided by the number of counties). 
11 In the case of Berguedá the LISA statistic is borderline significant. 
to point out the case of Val d’Aran, as it was the only county showing negative 
spatial dependence. The reason appears to be obvious by just catching a glimpse to 
Figure 1: Val d’Aran, the most anti-independence county, is surrounded by counties 
presenting high shares of votes backing Catalonia out of Spain. Finally, Figure A2 
in the Appendix revealed that spatial patterns of the high-high and low-low clusters 
are, needless to say, even more refined when using municipal-level data. Once 
again, however, some exceptions become apparent. 
 
3. The 2017 Regional Election in Catalonia: Some 
explanatory factors of the pro-independence vote 
After showing the pro-independence outcome of the 2017 Regional Election in 
Catalonia, the next step is to develop a model that, bearing in mind problems of 
data availability, is able to explain it. Although there are various theoretical 
approaches trying to explain voting results (namely the sociological model, the 
psychosocial model, and the rational choice theory), empirical studies tend to 
somewhat integrate all of them in looking for the key determinants of voting. This 
was the approach followed in this paper, paying particular attention to the 
determinants emphasized by the rational choice theory, also referred to as the model 
of economic voting, but as well to many other factors affecting voters’ behavior.  
Firstly, according to the aim of this paper, the dependent variable of our model was 
defined as the percentage of votes for parties in favor of independence collected in 
each county. As for the kind of explanatory variables we included in the model, we 
adapted what the theoretical models previously mentioned and most empirical 
papers agree to consider as key voting determinants. Anyway, it is important to note 
that the Catalonian independence, as Dow et al. (2018) state regarding the Scottish 
independence, is not only (not even primarily) an economic issue. That is to say, 
we fully agree with Akhter and Sheikh’s statement that “The behavior of a voter is 
influenced by several factors such as religion, …, community, language, money, 
policy or ideology, purpose of the polls, … and the like” (Akhter and Sheikh, 2014, 
p. 105). Therefore, along with some economic variables (namely per capita income, 
unemployment rate, poverty level, and industry-mix), we also included other 
variables such as birthplace, youth, education, population and population density. 
In addition, and taking into consideration the presence of spatial dependence (that, 
as we will see below, is confirmed in the model), we also included the spatial lag 
of the dependent variable.  
As for the specification of the model, we followed a forward variable selection 
process. In other words, variables were sequentially added, starting with the one 
explaining a higher percentage of the dependent variable. This process went on until 
none of the remaining variables was significant. The final model to be estimated 
with, apart from the spatial lag of the dependent variable, five groups of variables 
denoted by different groups of coefficients (𝛽, 𝜃, 𝛿, 𝛾, 𝜑), is summarized in equation 
(1): 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝 𝛼 𝛽 𝐵𝑂𝐶 𝜃 𝑌𝑃 𝜃 𝑂𝑃 𝛿 𝑃𝐸 𝛿 𝑃𝑇 𝛿 𝐻𝐸
𝛾 𝐴𝐺𝑅 𝛾 𝐶𝑂𝑁 𝛾 𝐶𝑂𝑀 𝛾 𝑇𝑅 𝛾 𝐻𝑂 𝛾 𝐹𝐴
𝛾 𝑃𝐴 𝜑 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 𝜑 𝑃𝑂𝑃 𝜑 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝐷 𝜑 𝑃𝑂𝑉 𝜑 𝑈𝑅
𝜌 ∑ 𝑊 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝 𝜀                               (1) 
where 𝑖 denotes the county. Data were collected from the Official Statistics Website 
of Catalonia (IDESCAT), and the definition of each variable included in the model, 
along with its descriptive statistics, is detailed in Table 1. Because of the procedure 
we employed to get the model, we show the estimation results in stages by 
including, step by step, the five sets of variables considered: (1) only the variable 
accounting for the percentage of people born outside Catalonia (𝐵𝑂𝐶 ); (2) the 
group of variables referring to the age of people residing in each county (𝑌𝑃 , 𝑂𝑃 ); 
(3) variables referring to the level of education 𝑃𝐸 , 𝑃𝑇 , 𝐻𝐸 ; (4) sectoral 
variables 𝐴𝐺𝑅 , 𝐶𝑂𝑁 , 𝐶𝑂𝑀 , 𝑇𝑅 , 𝐻𝑂 , 𝐹𝐴 , 𝑃𝐴 , leaving out the industry sector, 
so that, as it is obvious, every coefficient should be interpreted with respect to this 
sector; and (5) a last miscellaneous group of variables 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 , 𝑃𝑂𝑃 , 𝑃𝑂𝑃𝐷 , 𝑃𝑂𝑉 , 𝑈𝑅  sharing a common feature: none of them turned 
out to be statistically significant. 
Before presenting the results, however, it is convenient to take a pause and 
demonstrate the necessity of including a spatial lag of the dependent variable in the 
five versions of the model. As said before, in the previous section we confirmed the 
presence of spatial correlation in the percentage of votes for parties in favor of 
independence. In any case, on the one hand we have to formally test whether there 
is spatial dependence in the model as well, and, on the other, we have to figure out 
the type of spatial dependence, if any, that exists, as the final specification of the 
model depends crucially on it. To tackle these issues, a series of Lagrange multiplier 
(LM) tests were computed on the residuals of the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
estimation of the corresponding alternative ‘non-spatial’ versions of equation (1) 
(that is, without including the spatial lag of the dependent variable): the robust LM-
EL test, which null hypothesis is the absence of residual spatial autocorrelation, and 
the robust LM-LE test, which null hypothesis is the absence of substantive 
dependence. The results, displayed in Table 2, revealed that only for the LM-LE 
test the null hypothesis was rejected at the standard levels in the five alternative 
specifications of the model. Thus, our results supported the existence of substantive 
spatial dependence, so that the specification of equation (1) is correct.  
Thus, the results, obtained by maximum likelihood as OLS estimates are inefficient 
for cross-sectional models incorporating spatial error autocorrelation (Anselin, 
1988), are offered in Table 3. First, we want to stress that the various indexes of 
goodness-of-fit (last rows of Table 3) showed a good fit of the model to the data. 
These values are satisfactory to endorse the proposed model, so there is no doubt 
that the results obtained are quite reliable. 
As for the independent variables, we found that the share of the pro-independence 
vote is closely (and negatively) associated with the percentage of the population 
who was born outside the region (column (1)).12 Despite the fact that, for diverse 
reasons, a quite remarkable portion of people who were born in Catalonia feel 
(culturally, linguistically, politically) distinct from the rest of Spain, our results 
convey the idea that, as a rule, the pro-independence sentiment seems to be weaker 
among Catalans living together with people coming from the rest of Spain and 
abroad. In addition, it can be stated, in line with the results, that the sense of 
separateness is not such a strongly-rooted feeling among people who are living, but 
were not born, in Catalonia. 
                                                            
12 When splitting this variable into two, those born in Spain but out of the Catalonian region and 
those born abroad, the results revealed that the rejection of independence is stronger for the former. 
This negative relationship between the share of inhabitants born out of Catalonia 
and the pro-independence vote became even stronger when the age of voters is 
accounted for (column (2)). In particular, the younger the population, the higher the 
share of voters supporting pro-independence parties. The variable capturing the 
elder population did not result, however, significant. According to Salih (2014), 
support for independence is especially high among youth due to mainly two 
reasons: the widespread use of Catalan language at school and the dire 
consequences of the economic crisis. We cannot forget either that young people in 
Catalonia have experienced the boom of the secessionist sentiment over the new 
century. Although comparable just to a certain extent, our result is in stark contrast 
to the one found by Crescenzi et al. (2018) regarding the role of the youth in the 
Brexit. As Van Rompuy (2017) says, in the Brexit-referendum, unlike in the 
Catalonian one, older people were “wall” people, while younger people were “web” 
people. The opposite results in Catalonia are likely due to the fact that the Brexit 
and Catalonian cases are to a large extent antithetical cases, the former clearly 
against the EU and the latter assuming implicitly, but wrongly, that independence 
would not mean leaving the EU. 
The addition of different levels of human capital in the equation (column (3)) 
offered further insights. On the one hand, it seems that individuals with professional 
training education are not in favor of independence. On the other, higher education 
plays an important role as a factor explaining the pro-independence vote.13 As for 
the sectors (column (4)), the conclusion was that if we took two individuals, 
                                                            
13 A likely explanation of this result, in line with Azmanova (2011), is that independence increases 
uncertainty. As educated people tend to believe they can manage this uncertainty better than that 
less educated can, the firsts are more prone to independence than the seconds are. 
identical in terms of the other explanatory variables, the one working in 
construction would still be more likely than the one working in public services to 
vote in favor of independence. Coincidence or not, these are likely the two sectors 
more and less hit by the economic downturn, respectively.14 
Subsequently, we have to mention the remaining variables that were considered in 
the model specification but turned out all to be statistically non-significant.15 
Namely, variables not belonging to any of the previous groups and as diverse as per 
capita income, population, population density, poverty level, and the 
unemployment rate. These variables was included since, initially, they seemed to 
be, in many cases and according to, for instance, what is written by the popular 
press, potential explanatory factors for voting behavior. Yet, due to their limited 
explanatory power in the model, we show them in the final stage (column (5)). 
Hence, there is an important -and straightforward- conclusion that can be derived 
from this analysis: as we mentioned in the Introduction, taking bivariate 
correlations at face value is a risky option. As an example, the correlations between 
the percentage of the pro-independence vote and both population (-0.62) and 
population density (-0.66) seemed to convey the message that these two variables 
affect significantly the pro-independence outcome. However, our analysis has 
revealed that this is not true as they are just typical cases of spurious correlation. In 
                                                            
14 Although the pro-independence movement has to do with historical reasons, there are some papers 
(see, for example, Dowling 2014) linking its revival with the outbreak of the crisis in 2008. Indeed, 
according to data from the Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió regular polls on public sentiments of 
Catalonian citizens, the share of population defending Catalonia as an independent state was around 
25% in 2010, being nowadays higher than 40%. 
15 Some of the variables included in the first four specifications resulted also non-significant, but at 
least others belonging to the same group were. 
other words, a multivariate analysis (as the one carried out in the present paper) is 
necessary to get a better understanding of the election outcome. 
Finally, regarding the spatial lag of the dependent variable, it is important to note 
that its coefficient turns out to be positive and statistically significant in all cases, 
this reinforcing the previous conclusion that there is a geographical pattern in the 
pro-independence outcome, this being true even after assessing the role played by 
different explanatory factors. In other words, and as a rule, the share of pro-
independence voters of each county is closely related to that of its neighbors. 
 
4. Conclusions 
At a time of political turmoil in Spain, due to the serious consequences that the 
Catalonian pro-independence movement could bring about in the country but also 
in Europe,16 this paper has tried to uncover key factors helping us understand the 
share of the pro-independence vote in the December 21st, 2017 Regional Election 
in Catalonia. Unlike some popular press and media reports that, in the light of our 
results, have too quickly drawn some, at least partially, misleading conclusions, 
here a multivariate model was specified and estimated. Interestingly enough, the 
findings point out to the place of birth as the most influencing factor in the pro-
independence outcome. Additionally, they also suggest that young people are more 
pro-independence, as it also happens with highly qualified people and, just 
somewhat surprising, those working in the construction sector. On the contrary, our 
                                                            
16 We are referring to the challenge to the internal cohesion of territories in established countries 
that nationalism poses. The topic this paper addresses is, no doubt, timely, not only from the 
standpoint of Catalonia but also because of the potential consequences on other European regions 
that could take the Catalonian case as an example for the near future (Nagel and Rixen, 2015). 
findings reveal that people in the public service sector do not tend to support the 
pro-independence movement. Another important conclusion is that, contrary to 
some of the wrong conclusions reached by the popular press, this paper dismisses 
the commonly mentioned role played by the county size and level of income in 
shaping voting behavior. As a whole, our results do not strongly support the rational 
choice theory – model of economic voting – since its explanatory power seems to 
be limited. On the contrary, they reveal the role played by non-economic factors, 
mainly demographic and cultural ones, in explaining the pro-independence vote. 
Which are the implications of these results and what can we reasonably expect for 
the future? We must admit that, apart from the fact that spatial dependence is likely 
to continue playing an important role in shaping voters' preferences, it is impossible 
to answer conclusively about the prospects of the pro-independence vote; in other 
words, there is not enough basis to render a confident judgment about whether the 
pro-independence movement is going to grow in strength or not. There are many 
forces at play and everything will depend on the way politicians (both at the regional 
(Catalonia) and national levels) address the issue in the near future.17 Nevertheless, 
and being aware that the recently started conversations between the new Catalonian 
and Spanish governments are a crucial issue, as well as the somewhat ambiguity of 
CatComú-Podem party,18 our findings allow us to make some very preliminary and 
tentative assessments.  
                                                            
17 Indeed, the process (el Procés) has been generated top-down and not the opposite. 
18 Although the issue is beyond the scope of this paper, Appendix B redoes the analysis carried out 
here but now trying to find the main factors explaining CatComú-Podem’s votes. The results, quite 
opposite to the ones got for the pro-independence vote, convey the message that the main traits of 
the CatComú-Podem's voter differ substantially from the ones characterizing the voters in favor of 
independence. 
First, despite its limited explanatory power, we could refer to the rational choice 
theory. More specifically, to the fundamentals of economic voting and its basic idea 
referred to as the reward-punishment hypothesis. From this perspective, it is no 
wonder to believe that the longer the duration of the economic downturn, the higher 
the pro-independence feeling. Not only this, if, as some respected voices argue, a 
new recession period is brewing, the pro-independence vote could be strengthened 
even further. In fact, there are some researchers (e.g. Dowling, 2014) linking the 
rise in the pro-independence vote with the outbreak of the 2008 economic crisis.  
Second, and given the importance of birthplace, it seems clear that the role played 
by migratory movements when it comes to foreseeing the future of the pro-
independence faction might become crucial. These movements are influenced by 
numerous factors, one of which is the path taken by the independence process in 
itself. Another one is clearly related to making the knowledge of Catalan 
compulsory (or near compulsory) at both school and work (Clots-Figueras and 
Masella, 2013); if this happens, and there is a big “if” here, it will undoubtedly work 
as a barrier for potential migrants going to Catalonia.  
Third, with regard to the influence of the age of people on the pro-independence 
vote, we think that there are several possibilities to be discussed, without being 
certain which one will have a higher impact. If the recent secessionist sentiment 
perpetuates over time and across generations and it is effectively taking root in 
young people, it is obvious that not only the new voters but also the not so new will 
be pro-independence. However, the opposite could also be the case if, as sometimes 
happen, young people change their minds as they get older and the share of young 
people in the total population decreases. 
Finally, and with regard to the educational level, it is likely that most people will 
become better educated in the future. According to our results, this fact conveys the 
message that is likely that the pro-independence vote increases in the coming years.  
Putting all these possibilities together, we have to acknowledge that it is really 
difficult, if not impossible, to foresee what might happen with the pro-independence 
vote in the future. What seems to be evident is that if the independence movement 
in Catalonia turns out to be strengthened in the coming years, it will strike a severe 
blow to the Spanish government and, even if only because of the possible contagion 
effect, will be quite risky for Europe.19 Only time will tell. 
  
                                                            
19 Indirectly, the World Economic Forum (World Economic Forum, 2018, p. 10) has referred to 
Catalonia in its latest report. It warns, “Issues of cultural and identity problems are causing political 
tensions in and among a growing number of EU countries, including Poland, Hungary and, in 
different ways, Spain. Polarization between groups with different cultural heritages and values seem 
to continue to be a source of political risk in Western countries in 2018 and beyond”. 
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Figure 1. Percentage of votes won by pro-independence political parties 
 
 
Note: (1) Alt Camp; (2) Alt Empordà; (3) Alt Penedès; (4) Alt Urgell; (5) Alta Ribagorça; (6) Anoia; 
(7) Bages; (8) Baix Camp; (9) Baix Ebre; (10) Baix Empordà; (11) Baix Llobregat; (12) Baix 
Penedès; (13) Barcelonès; (14) Berguedà; (15) Cerdanya; (16) Conca de Barberà; (17) Garraf; (18) 
Garrigues; (19) Garrotxa; (20) Gironès; (21) Maresme; (22) Montsià; (23) Noguera; (24) Osona; 
(25) Pallars Jussà; (26) Pallars Sobirà; (27) Pla d'Urgell; (28) Pla de l'Estany; (29) Priorat; (30) 
Ribera d'Ebre; (31) Ripollès; (32) Segarra; (33) Segrià; (34) Selva; (35) Solsonès; (36) Tarragonès; 




Figure 2. Clusters of the pro-independence vote (LISA analysis) 
 
 
Note: (1) Alt Camp; (2) Alt Empordà; (3) Alt Penedès; (4) Alt Urgell; (5) Alta Ribagorça; (6) Anoia; 
(7) Bages; (8) Baix Camp; (9) Baix Ebre; (10) Baix Empordà; (11) Baix Llobregat; (12) Baix 
Penedès; (13) Barcelonès; (14) Berguedà; (15) Cerdanya; (16) Conca de Barberà; (17) Garraf; (18) 
Garrigues; (19) Garrotxa; (20) Gironès; (21) Maresme; (22) Montsià; (23) Noguera; (24) Osona; 
(25) Pallars Jussà; (26) Pallars Sobirà; (27) Pla d'Urgell; (28) Pla de l'Estany; (29) Priorat; (30) 
Ribera d'Ebre; (31) Ripollès; (32) Segarra; (33) Segrià; (34) Selva; (35) Solsonès; (36) Tarragonès; 
















% Votes for 












Born out of 
Catalonia 
𝐵𝑂𝐶   
% Inhabitants 































































































































































































% of incomes 























Note: Data were collected from the Official Statistics Website of Catalonia (IDESCAT) for the last year available 




Table 2. LM tests for spatial dependence 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)  
Robust Lagrange multiplier test 
for spatial error dependence 
(robust LM-EL) 
0.409  0.480 0.318  0.043** 0.017**  
Robust Lagrange multiplier test 
for spatial lag dependence 
(robust LM-LE) 
0.031**  0.057* 0.003***  0.001*** 0.003***  
Notes: associated p values are reported; *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%.  
 
 
Table 3. Pro-independence vote: Some explanatory factors 
Dependent variable: % of votes 
for parties in favor of 
independence 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) 
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Information and Communication 















% of GAV in Public 
Administration 





Per capita income     
 -0.12 
(0.154) 
Population     
 0.19 
(0.946) 
Population density     
 -2.71 
(0.172) 
Poverty level     
 -0.31 
(0.465) 
Unemployment rate     
 -0.09 
(0.604) 












Log likelihood -137.4 -136.0 -131.8 -127.8  -124.4 
R squared 0.784 0.793 0.829 0.861  0.879 
Notes: p values in parentheses: *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%.
Appendix A 
In this appendix, we show the main results obtained from the spatial analysis of pro-
independence vote at the municipal level. 
 












Here we show the results obtained when the dependent variable is the share of votes 
obtained by CatComú-Podem. This is because we consider that the ambiguity of this party 
(they are in favor of the right of auto-determination in Catalonia and some of its leaders 
declared themselves as pro-independence) could be determinant in foreseeing the 
evolving situation in Catalonia.  
 
Table B1. CatComú-Podem’s vote: Some explanatory factors 
Dependent variable: % of votes of 
CatComú-Podem 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) 









































% of population with higher post-























% of GAV in Transport, Information 
and Communication 




















Per capita income     
 -0.00 
(0.966) 
Population     
 -0.32 
(0.463) 
Population density     
 0.47* 
(0.056) 
Poverty level     
 0.06 
(0.237) 
Unemployment rate     
 0.00 
(0.839) 










Log likelihood -57.2 -55.3 -53.5 -49.65  -46.75 
R squared 0.815 0.827 0.838 0.861  0.877 
Notes: p values in parentheses: *** Significant at 1%; ** Significant at 5%; * Significant at 10%. 
